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I
n September of 2009, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) 
announced that it would not 
prosecute former DOJ Civil Rights 
Division official Bradley Schlozman 
for alleged false statements made 
during his congressional testimony 
about personnel actions at DOP 
As many government lawyers will 
remember, a July 2, 2008, report 
of the DOJ Office of Professional 
Responsibility and Office of the 
Inspector General (hereinafter, the 
IG's report) found that Schlozman 
had violated the Civil Service Reform 
Act when he "considered political 
and ideological affiliations in hiring 
career attorneys and other personnel 
actions affecting career attorneys in 
the Civil Rights Division."2 
The IG's report found that Schloz-
man declined a lunch invitation with 
the assistant attorney general for 
civil rights, explaining in an email, 
"Unfortunately I have an interview 
at 1 with some lefty who we'll never 
hire but I'm extending a courtesy 
interview as a favor."3 In another 
email, Schlozman wrote that a Crimi-
nal Section deputy chief "has recom-
mended several other commies for 
permanent positions in [the section]. 
[The Criminal Section chief] probably 
would concur with his recommenda-
tions. But as long as I'm here, adher-
ents of Mao's little red book need 
not apply. "4 And Schlozman wrote 
in a July 15, 2003, email, "I too get 
to work with mold spores, but here 
in Civil Rights, we call them Voting 
Section attorneys." Continuing the 
exchange the next day, he wrote, "My 
tentative plans are to gerrymander 
all of these crazy libs right out of the 
section."s 
As a former Deputy Chief of the 
Department of Justice Civil Rights 
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Division, I witnessed firsthand belea-
guered career lawyers struggling to 
enforce the nation's civil rights laws 
while at the same time enduring 
offensive, morale-damaging labels. 
Career attorneys were deemed 
"disloyal," "not to be trusted" and 
not" on the team" while others were 
deemed "real Americans" or "right-
thinking Americans" based on real or 
assumed partisan leanings.6 
Such barefaced statements are 
probably rare, but unfortunately a 
more subtle use of political consid-
erations is not unheard of among 
lawyers at all levels of government. 
Often after the transition to a new 
administration, government lawyers 
wonder if their new boss will be 
overtly political or if they will be 
transferred or fired. Most govern-
ment lawyers inherently understand 
that while consideration of partisan-
ship is appropriate when hiring for 
political positions, it is entirely inap-
propriate for career positions. 
The experiences of lawyers in the 
Civil Rights Division should serve as 
a powerful lesson to governmental 
agencies across the country about 
when it is permissible to consider 
political patronage for employment 
purposes. 
Distinguishing Career and 
Political Appointees in the 
Federal Government 
The Code of Federal Regula-
tions defines career positions as those 
"which are not of a confidential 
or policy-determining character."7 
Career attorneys serve regardless of 
political affiliation and are gener-
ally perceived as nonpartisan. Their 
obligation is to the public; they 
have no duty to espouse loyalty to a 
political group or ideology. Indeed, 
federal government employees have 
strictly prescribed limits on partisan 
political activity.8 The Office of 
Attorney Recruitment and Manage-
ment, responsible for career attorney 
hiring for DOJ, specifically states 
on its website that discrimination in 
hiring based on politics is prohibit-
ed.9 Beyond DOJ policies, the Civil 
Service Reform Act (CSRA) states 
that career attorneys should be hired 
based on ability, skill and knowledge, 
not political affiliation.lo Career 
attorneys often possess years, and 
sometimes decades of institutional 
memory. They are arguably vital to 
smooth transitions from one admin-
istration to the next. 
By contrast, political appointees 
generally promote the adminis-
tration's policies and develop an 
enforcement agenda. They hold 
"positions which are policy-deter-
mining or which involve a close 
and confidential working relation-
ship with the head of an agency 
or other key appointed officials."ll 
Courts have defined political affili-
ation as "commonality of political 
purpose, partisan activity, and 
political support."12 When hiring for 
a political position, it is acceptable 
for an employer to inquire about a 
potential employee's political affilia-
tion. However, the Code of Federal 
Regulations and federal law specifi-





Schlozman participated inthehiring 
of 99 of the 112 lawyers hired during 
his tenure in the Civ:il Rights Division. 
Only 13 lawyers were hired inthe divi-
sion withoulSchlozman'~ involvement 
d u ri ngh is tenl1re; \/irtually,a Ilof the 
lawyers (97percent) 'hired 'QySchloz-
man whose political, andideolog ical 
affilic;ltions were~videnfinthe hiring 
process were Republican or conserva-
tive (630f 65).,Schlozman hired only 
two Ic;lwyers who had Democratic or 
I ibera I affi liations. By contrast, when 
Schlozman was not involved in the 
hiring process, the.r:esults were more 
balanced:fourRepubli(;an or conserva-
tive lawyers andthree Democratic or 
liberallawyerswerehired.* 
'u.s. Dept of Justice Office of Profl Responsibility, & 
Office oHhe lnspector'Ge~:, An Investigation of Allegations 
of Politicizea:Hiringandbtfrer Improper Personnel Actions 
in the <Civil Rightsl'.!ivisit;>n33(2008),available at wVIMwsdoj, 
gov/oig/specialls09,01Ifinai:pdf. 
Politics and Employment at the 
State and Local Levels 
The Supreme Court has clarified 
the law regarding politically moti-
vated employment decisions at the 
state and local government level. 
Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel are 
the two most notable cases on politi-
cally motivated dismissals. In Elrod 
v. Burns,14 non-civil service employ-
ees of the Cook County, Illinois, 
sheriff's office brought an action 
alleging that they were fired solely 
because they were not affiliated with 
the new sheriff's political party. The 
Court held that public employees 
are protected against politically 
motivated dismissals under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments 
unless they are policymakers. The 
Court characterized policymakers as 
employees with significant respon-
sibility or those who act as advisors. 
The sheriff's office employees were 
not policymakers and were thereby 
protected by the First Amendment. 
In Branti v. Finkel,15 two Rockland 
County, New York, assistant public 
defenders brought suit to enjoin the 
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newly appointed public defender 
from terminating them solely 
because of their political affiliation. 
De-emphasizing the Elrod policy-
maker exception, the Court stated, 
"The issue is not whether the label 
'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits 
the particular public office in ques-
tion, but rather whether the hiring 
authority can demonstrate that party 
affiliation is an appropriate require-
ment for the effective performance of 
the office."16 Finding that the respon-
sibility of assistant public defenders 
is to their clients and that political 
affiliation does not affect office per-
formance, the Court held that their 
employment was protected under 
the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments and granted injunctive relief. 
In Rutan v. Republican Party of 
Illinois,!? the Court extended the 
rule of Elrod and Branti to politically 
motivated promotions, transfers, 
and hiring and rehiring decisions. 
In Rutan, Illinois public employees 
challenged the governor's use of 
political considerations in employ-
ment decisions. IS The Court stated 
that" conditioning hiring decisions 
on political belief and association 
plainly constitutes an unconstitu-
tional condition, unless the govern-
ment has a vital interest in doing 
SO."19 Finding no such government 
interest in this case, the Court held 
that hiring, promotions, rehiring and 
transfers based on political affilia-
tion or support are an impermissible 
infringement on public employees' 
First Amendment rights. 
A recent Second Circuit case 
provides additional illumination. In 
Almonte v. City of Long Beach,2° former 
city employees affiliated with the 
Democratic Party brought an action 
under 42 U.s.c. § 1983 against the 
city, city manager, and Republican 
Party-affiliated members of the city 
council, alleging that the decision 
to eliminate their positions violated 
free speech and due process and 
constituted a politically motivated 
conspiracy in violation of Sections 
1985 and 1986. The court of appeals 
developed a list of factors to con-
sider when determining whether an 
employee may constitutionally be 
discharged on the basis of political 
affiliation. These include whether 
the employee 
(1) is exempt from civil 
service protection, (2) has 
some technical competence 
or expertise, (3) controls oth-
ers, (4) is authorized to speak 
in the name of policymak-
ers, (5) is perceived as a 
policymaker by the public, 
(6) influences government 
programs, (7) has contact 
with elected officials, and 
Impro political 
hiring and firing 
not only affects 
the individual 
employee but also 
greatly impacts the 
public's confidence 
in nonpartisan 
enforcement of key laws 
that affect its safety 
and I-being. 
(8) is responsive to partisan 
politics and politicalleaders.21 
While the list is not exhaustive 
and no single factor is determinative, 
these indicators are helpful in assess-
ing whether a politically motivated 
employment decision is appropriate 
or permissible. 
Impact of Political Hiring and 
Firing 
Improper political hiring and 
firing not only affects the individual 
employee but also greatly impacts 
the public's confidence in nonpar-
tisan enforcement of key laws that 
affect its safety and well-being. In her 
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Sampling of Sta1::utes that Protect Career Attorneys 
The CivilServiceRefolmAct (CSRA) prohibits federal agencies from discrimi-
nating in hiring forcareerpositionsbased on political affiliation. For example, 
the CSRA states that federal agencies rnLlstadopt hiring practices for career 
employees in which "selec~ionandadvancefllentshould be determined solely 
on the basis of relative ability, knowledge, and skills, afterfair and open com-
petition which assures that all receive equal opportunity." 5 U.s.c. § 2301(b){1). 
5 U.S .. c. §2301(b)(2}. All employees and applic:antsforemployment should 
receive fair andequitabletreatmenfinall aspects of personnel management 
without regardto poHticalaffiliation, race,tolor, religion, national origin, sex, 
marital status, age,or bandici3Ppingcondition,andwith proper regard for 
their privacy and tohstitutionalrights~ 
5 C.F.R.§ 213;3301{a),Upol1~pec:ific authorization by QPM,agencies rnay 
make appointments under this section to positions which are policy-determin-
ing or whichihvolvea .dose and.C:oniidential working relationship with the 
head of an agency oro~herkeyappointedoffidals. Positions filled under this 
authority are excepted from thec?rripetitive service and constitute Schedule 
C. Each position will be assigned i3r1umberfrQrn §213.3302to § 213:3999, or 
other appropriatenjJmber, to be. us,edby ~he agency in recording appoint-
ments made urlderthatal.lthprizatjon. . 
28 C.F.R.§ 42.1(a).ltisthepolicyoftheDepartmentof Justiceto seek to 
eliminate discrirnination9n the basispf race; color, religion, sex; sexual orien-
tation, nationCiI origin, maritalsta~jJS,Politicalaffiliation,age, or physical or 
mental hanqicap inefllployment yvithinthe Department and to. assure equal 
employment opportunity for all employees and applicants for. employment. 
law review article, Lessons Learned: 
Voting Rights and the Bush Administra-
tion, Professor Pam Karlan argues 
that 
[t]he lessons we can learn 
from what went wrong 
during the Bush years are 
both substantive and pro-
cedural. On the substantive 
front, we saw the specter of 
fraud, rather than the risk of 
exclusion, come to dominate 
the debate over democratic 
integrity .... On the pro-
cedural front, we saw an 
administration transform the 
Department of Justice, and 
particularly the Civil Rights 
Division's Voting Section, 
from a nonpartisan protector 
of voting rights into a politi-
cal actor. 22 
While policy decisions may 
legitimately dictate where each 
administration places its enforcement 
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emphasis, it can be argued that 
another purpose of nonpartisan 
career attorneys is to temper large 
shifts in emphasis so that there is a 
more even level of enforcement. 
The use of political affiliation as a 
litmus test for employment and the 
subsequent disintegration of employ-
ee morale can also lead to a mass 
exodus of experienced lawyers. This 
happened in the Civil Rights Division 
as a large number of employees were 
transferred or resigned. Recently, 
Attorney General Eric Holder said 
that the division is "getting back to 
doing what it has traditionally done. 
But it's really only a start. I think the 
wounds that were inflicted on this 
division were deep, and it will take 
some time for them to fully heal."23. 
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